

# COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

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"I ever abominated that scheme of politics, (now about 30 years old) of setting up a monied interest in opposition to the landed. For I conceived, there could not be a truer maxim in our government than this, that the possessors of the soil are the best judges of what is for the advantage of the kingdom. If others had thought the same way, funds of credit and South Sea projects would neither have been felt nor heard of."—SWIFT, 1720.

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## TO THE PUBLIC.

This was the week for publishing the second *Double Number* of this Volume of the Register; but, in consequence of the increase of time that I have now upon my hands, and in the hope that I shall be able to employ that time with advantage to the public, I have determined upon the following alteration in the publication of this work; that is to say; to publish two SHEETS IN EVERY WEEK, one on the Saturday, as at present, and the other on the Wednesday; and, to discontinue wholly the double numbers, except at the close of the Volumes, when a second sheet will be absolutely necessary for the insertion of the Tables of Contents and Indexes.—

The first WEDNESDAY'S NUMBER will be published on the Wednesday after next; that is, on the 12th of this month.—

The hour of publication will, after the 12th instant, be TWO o'clock, instead of THREE.—The Wednesday's Numbers will, of course, be sent, by the newsmen, to the gentlemen who take the work, unless a special direction be given to the contrary.

## PAPER AGAINST GOLD:

BEING AN EXAMINATION  
OF THE

*Report of the Bullion Committee:*

IN A SERIES OF LETTERS

TO THE

TRADESMEN AND FARMERS  
IN AND NEAR SALISBURY.

### LETTER I.

*Appointment of the Bullion Committee—Main points of the Report—Proposition for the Bank to pay in two years—To merit the appellation of a thinking people, we must shew that our thinking produces knowledge—Go back into the history of paper-money—Definition of money—Increase of paper—What is the cause of this increase?—Origin of the Bank of England—How it came to pass that so much paper money got afloat—Increase of bank-notes wanted to pay the increase of the interest on the National Debt—Progress in issuing bank-notes from 20 to 1 pounds—Suspicion awakened in 1797; which produced the stoppage of gold and silver payments at the Bank of England.*

Gentlemen,

During the last session of parliament, a Committee, that is to say, ten or twelve members, of the House of Commons were appointed to inquire into the cause of the high price of Gold Bullion, that is, Gold not coined; and to take into consideration the state of the circulating medium, or money, of this country. This Committee have made a *Report*, as they call it; but, it is a great book that they have written, and have had printed; a book much larger than the whole of the New Testament. Of this Report I intend to enter into an Examination; and, as you have recently felt, and are still feeling, some of the effects of

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Paper-Money. I think it may not be amiss, if, upon this occasion, I address myself to you. I have introduced myself to you without any ceremony; but, before we part, we shall become well acquainted; and, I make no doubt, that you will understand the distinction between Paper-Money and Gold-Money much too well for it to be in the power of any one ever again to deceive you; which understanding, will, in the times now fast approaching, be of great utility to all those amongst you, who may have the means of laying up money, however small the quantity may be.

The Committee above-mentioned, which, for brevity's sake, I call the Bullion Committee, sent for several persons, whom they examined as witnesses, touching the matters in question. There was SIR FRANCIS BARING, for instance, the great loan-maker, and GOLDSMID, the rich Jew, whose name you so often see in the newspapers, where he is stated to give grand dinners to princes and great men. The Evidence of these, and other money-dealers and merchants, the Bullion Committee have had printed; and, upon this evidence, as well as upon the Report itself, we shall have to make some remarks.

The result of the Committee's inquiries is, in substance, this; that the high price of gold is occasioned by the low value of the paper-money; that the low value of the paper-money has been occasioned (as, you know, the low value of apples is) by the great abundance of it; that the only way to lower the price of the gold is to raise the value of the paper-money; and that the only way to raise the value of the paper-money is to make the quantity of it less than it now is. Thus far, as you will clearly see, there was no conjuration required. The fact is, that, not only do these propositions contain well-known, and almost self-evident, truths; but, these truths have, during the last two or three years, and especially during the last year, been so frequently stated in print, that it was next to impossible, that any person in England, able to read, should have been unacquainted with them. But, having arrived at the conclusion, that, in order to raise the value of the paper-money, its quantity must be lessened; having come to this point, the rest of the way was more difficult; for, the next object was, to point out the means of lessening the quantity of the paper-money.

which, in my opinion will never be effected, unless those means include the destruction of the whole mass.

Not so, however, think the Gentlemen of the Bullion Committee. They think, or, at least, they evidently wish to make others think, that it is possible to lessen the quantity of the paper-money, and to cause guineas to come back again and to pass from hand to hand as in former times; they would fain have us believe, that this can be done without the total destruction of the paper-money; and, indeed, they have actually recommended to the House of Commons to pass a law to cause the Bank in Threadneedle Street, London, commonly called the Bank of England, to pay its notes in real money, at the END OF TWO YEARS from this time. Two years is a pretty good lease for people to have of this sort. This Bank promises to pay, on demand. It does this upon the face of every one of its notes; and, therefore, as a remedy for the evil of want of gold, to propose, that this Bank should begin to pay in two years time, is something, which, I think, would not have been offered to the public in any age but this, and, even in this age, to any public except the public in this country. The notes of the Bank of England bear, upon the face of them, a promise that the Bankers, or Bank Company, who issue the notes, will pay the notes upon demand. Now, what do we mean by paying a note? Certainly we do not mean, the giving of one note for another note. Yet, this is the sort of payment, that people get at the Bank of England; and this sort of payment the Bullion Committee does not propose even to begin to put an end to in less than two years from this time.

Gentlemen; we, the people of this country, have been persuaded to believe many things. We have been persuaded to believe ourselves to be "the most thinking people in Europe;" but, to what purpose do men think, unless they arrive at useful knowledge by thinking? To what purpose do men think, if they are, after all their thinking, to be persuaded, that a Bank, which has not paid its promissory notes in gold for thirteen years and a half, will be able to pay them in gold at the end of fifteen years and a half, the quantity of the notes having gone on regularly increasing? If men are to be persuaded to believe this, to what purpose



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do they think? But, before I proceed any further in my remarks upon the Report of the Bullion Committee; before I proceed to lay before you the *exposures* now made by the labours of this Committee; the facts now become *evident* through this channel; the *confessions* now made by these members of the House of Commons: before I proceed to lay these before you, and to remark upon the remedies, proposed by the Committee, it will be necessary for me to go back a few years into the *history of the paper-money*; because, without doing this, I shall be talking to you of things, of which you will have no clear notion, and the reasonings, relating to which, you will, of course, not at all understand. It is a great misfortune, that any portion of your time should be spent in reading or thinking about matters of this kind; but, such is our present situation in this country, that every man, who has a family to preserve from want, ought to endeavour to make himself acquainted with the nature, and with the probable consequences, of the paper-money now afloat.

*Money* is the *representative*, or the *token* of property, or *things of value*. The money, while used as money, is of no other use; and, therefore, a bit of lead or of wood or of leather, would be as good as gold or silver, to be used as money. But, if these materials, which are every where found in such abundance, were to be used as money, there would be so much money made, that there would be no end to it; and, besides, the money made in one country would, however there enforced by law, have no value in any other country. For these reasons *Gold* and *Silver*, which are amongst the most scarce of things, have been, by all the nations that we know any thing of, used as money. While the money of any country consists of nothing but these scarce metals; while it consists of nothing but gold and silver, there is no fear of its becoming *too abundant*; but if the money of a country be made of lead, tin, wood, leather, or paper; and, if any one can make it, who may choose to make it, there needs no extraordinary wisdom to foresee, that there will be a great abundance of this sort of money, and that the gold and silver money, being, in fact, no longer of any use in such a state of things, will go, either into the hoards of the prudent, or into the bags of those, who have the means of sending or

carrying them to those foreign countries where they are wanted, and where they will bring their value.

That a state of things like that here spoken of, does now exist in this country, is notorious to all the world. But, while we are all acquainted with the fact, and while many of us are most sensibly feeling the *effects*, scarcely a man amongst us takes the trouble to inquire into the *cause*; yet, unless the cause be ascertained, how are we to apply, or to judge of, a *remedy*? We see the country abounding with paper-money; we see every man's hand full of it; we frequently talk of it as a strange thing, and a great evil; but, never do we inquire into the cause of it.

There are few of you, who cannot remember the time, when there was scarcely ever seen a bank note among Tradesmen and Farmers. I can remember, when this was the case; and, when the farmers in my country hardly ever saw a bank-note, except when they sold their hops at Weyhill fair. People, in those days, used to carry little bags to put their money in, instead of the paste-board or leather cases that they now carry. If you look back, and take a little time to think, you will trace the gradual increase of paper-money, and the like decrease of gold and silver money. At first there were no bank notes under 20 pounds; next they came to 15 pounds; next to 10 pounds: at the beginning of the last war, they came to 5 pounds; and, before the end of it, they came down to 2 and to 1 pounds. How long it will be before they come down to parts of a pound, it would, perhaps, be difficult to say; but in Kent, at least, there are country notes in circulation to an amount so low as that of seven shillings. It is the *cause* of this that is interesting to us; the *cause* of this change in our money, and, in the *prices* of goods of all sorts and of labour. All of you who are forty years of age can remember, when the price of the gallon loaf used to be about ten pence or a shilling instead of two shillings and six pence or two shillings and ten pence, as it now is. These effects strike you. You talk of them every day; but the *cause* of them you seldom, if ever, either talk or think of; and, it is to this cause that I am now endeavouring to draw your attention.

You have, during the last seventeen years, seen the quantity of paper-money



rapidly increase; or in other words, you have, day after day, seen less and less of gold and silver appear in payments, and, of course, more and more of paper-money. But, it was not 'till the year 1797, that the paper-money began to increase so very fast. It was then that the *two and one pound notes* were first made by the Bank of England. It was then, in short, that paper-money became completely predominant. But, you will naturally ask me, "what was the cause of that?" The cause was, that the Bank of England *stopped paying its notes in gold and silver*. What! stop paying its notes? Refuse to pay its *promissory notes*? The Bank of England, when its notes were presented, *refuse to pay them*? Yes: and, what is more, an Act of parliament, brought in by Pitt, was passed, to protect the Bank of England against the legal consequences of such refusal. So that, the people, who held promissory notes of the Bank, and who had, perhaps, given gold or silver for them, when they went to the Bank for payment, were told, that they could have no gold or silver, but that they might have other notes, *more paper*, if they pleased, in exchange for the paper they held in their hands and tendered for payment. From that time to this, the Act of parliament, authorizing the Bank of England to refuse to pay its notes in gold and silver, has been in force. At first it was passed for *three months*; next 'till the parliament should meet again; then it was to last to the end of the war; then, when peace came, it was continued just for a year, 'till things should be settled; then, as things were not quite settled, it was continued till parliament should meet again; and, as this present war had begun by that time, the act was made to continue 'till *six months after the next peace*. The reasons given upon the different occasions, it will be very material to notice; for, it is this stoppage in the payment of gold and silver at the Bank of England upon which the whole question turns. Every thing hangs upon this; and, when we come to examine that part of the Report, which treats of the Bank's reviving its payments in gold and silver, we shall find it of great use to us to recur to the *reasons*, the divers, the manifold, reasons that were given, at different times, for suspending those payments. Since that suspension took place, you have seen the gold and silver disappear; you have seen, that paper has supplied the place of gold; paper-money makers have

set up all over the kingdom; and might not this well happen, when, to pay paper-money nothing more than paper money was required? But, the *reasons* given for this measure of suspension; the reasons given for the passing of an Act of Parliament to protect the Bank of England against the demands of its creditors are seldom recurred to, though, as you will presently see, without recurring to those reasons, and without ascertaining the *true cause* of the passing of that Act of Parliament, we cannot form so good a judgment relative to the *remedy* now proposed; namely, that of the Bank of England's reviving its payments in gold and silver. This is the remedy, which the Bullion Committee propose; and, you will say, a very good remedy it is; a very good remedy indeed; for people, who have, for so long a time, not paid their notes in gold and silver, to begin to pay their notes, in gold and silver, is a very good remedy; but, the thing to ascertain, is, *can the remedy be applied*? This is the question for us to discuss. It required nobody to tell us, that *paying in gold and silver* would be an effectual remedy for the evils arising from *not paying in gold and silver*; but, it required much more than I have yet heard to convince me, that to pay again in gold and silver was possible.

The chief object of our inquiries being this: *Whether it be possible, without a total destruction of all the paper-money, to restore gold and silver to circulation amongst us*; this being the chief object of our inquiries, we should first ascertain *how the gold and silver was driven out of circulation*, and had its place supplied by a paper-money; for, unless we get at a clear view of this, it will be next to impossible for us to reason satisfactorily upon the means of bringing gold and silver back again into circulation.

Some people suppose, that paper *always* made a part of the currency, or common money, of England. They seem to regard the Bank of England as being as old as the Church of England, at least, and some of them appear to have full as much veneration for it. The truth is, however, that the Bank of England is a mere human institution, arising out of causes having nothing miraculous, or supernatural, about them; and that both the institution and the agents who carry it on, are as mortal as any other thing and any other men, in

this or in any other way, as it is called. In 1694, that is, 100 years ago; and it was then that WILLIAM III. had begun wanting more money, which was passed in the year of his reign, and was voluntary and the sum of it, curing the paper, also for security, capital, taxes, and other liquors, of this money, to maintain time, to be incorporated, advanced in, took place, were formerly called "The Bank." When more had been borrowed, this way of it grew up a trade. Funds (of which) but the Bank, its primitive nature increased in riches and

Thus, you see, your attention was and to reflections and go on silver here this country came to pass got afloat.

The Act just referred to, which the Bank of England shall trade things, to Exchange, to restrain called bank, empowered other way than mere amount of it, they rested. It did than any of it.



this or in any other country. THE BANK, as it is called, had its origin in the year 1694, that is, a hundred and sixteen years ago; and it arose thus: the then King, WILLIAM III, who had come from Holland, had begun a war against France, and, wanting money to carry it on, an act was passed (which act was the 20th of the 5th year of his reign) to invite people to make voluntary advances to the government of the sum of 1,500,000 pounds, and for securing the payment of the interest, and also for securing the re-payment of the principal, taxes were laid upon beer, ale, and other liquors. Upon condition of 1,200,000*l.* of this money being advanced, within a certain time, the subscribers to the loan were to be incorporated; and, as the money was advanced in due time, the incorporation took place, and the lenders of the money were formed into a trading Company, called "THE GOVERNOR AND COMPANY OF THE BANK OF ENGLAND." In time, when more and more and more money had been borrowed by the government, in this way of mortgage upon the taxes, there grew up a thing called the *Stocks*, or the *Funds* (of which we will speak hereafter); but the Bank Company remained under its primitive name, and, as the *debt* of the nation increased, this Company increased in riches and in consequence.

Thus, you see, and it is well worthy of your attention, the Bank had its rise in war and taxation. But, we must reserve reflections of this sort for other occasions, and go on with our inquiries how gold and silver have been driven out of circulation in this country, or, in other words, how it came to pass, that so much paper money got afloat.

The Act of Parliament, which I have just referred to, points out the manner in which the Bank Company shall carry on their trade, and the articles in which they shall trade, allowing them, amongst other things, to trade in gold, silver, bills of Exchange, and other things, under certain restrictions; but, as to what are called *bank-notes*, the Company was not empowered to issue any such, in any other way, or upon any other footing, than merely as *promissory notes*, for the amount of which, in the coin of the country, they were liable to be sued and arrested. Having, however, a greater credit than any other individuals, or company of individuals, the Bank Company

issued notes to a greater amount; and, which was something new in England, they were made payable, not to any particular person, or his order, and not at any particular time; but to the bearer, and on demand. These characteristics, which distinguished the promissory notes of the Bank from all other promissory notes, gave the people greater confidence in them; and, as the Bank Company were always ready to pay the notes in Gold and Silver, when presented for payment, the notes became, in time, to be looked upon as being as good as gold and silver. Hence came all our country sayings: "*As good as the Bank*;" "*As solid as the Bank*;" and the like. Yet, the Bank was, as we have seen, merely a company of mortal men, formed into an association of traders; and their notes nothing more than written promises to pay the bearer so much money in gold or silver.

We used to have other sayings about the Bank; such as, "*As rich as the Bank*;" "*All the gold in the Bank*;" and such like, always conveying a notion, that the Bank was a place, and a place, too, where there were great heaps of money. As long as the Company were ready and willing to pay, and did actually pay, their notes in gold and silver, to all those persons who wished to have gold and silver, it is clear that these opinions of the people, relative to the Bank, were not altogether unfounded; for, though no bit of paper, or of any thing which has no value in itself, can be, in fact, so good as a bit of gold; still, if it will, at any moment, whenever the holder pleases, bring him gold or silver to the amount written upon it, it is very nearly as good as gold and silver; and, at the time of which we are speaking, this was the case with the promissory notes of the Bank Company. But, it must be evident, that, though the Company were ready, at the time now referred to, to pay their notes in gold and silver, they had never in their money chests a sufficiency of gold and silver to pay off all their notes, if they had been presented all at once. This must be evident to every man; because, if the Bank Company kept locked up as much gold and silver as their notes amounted to, they could get nothing by issuing their notes, and might just as well have sent out their gold and silver. A farmer, for instance, who is generally using a hundred pounds of money to pay his workmen, might lend the hundred



pounds and get interest for it, if he could persuade his workmen to take promissory notes of his own drawing, instead of money, and, if he were sure, that these promissory notes would not be brought in for payment; but, if this was not the case, he would be compelled to keep the hundred pounds in his drawer ready to give those who did not like to keep his promissory notes; and, in such case, it is clear, that the money would be of no use to him, and that he might full as well have none of his notes out. Just so with the Bank Company, who, at no time, could have in hand gold and silver enough to pay off all their notes at once; nor was this necessary as long as the people regarded those notes as being equally good with gold and silver. But, it is clear, that this opinion of the goodness of the Company's notes, or, rather, the feeling of confidence, or, still more properly, perhaps, the absence of all suspicion, with respect to them, must, in a great degree, depend upon the quantity of notes seen in circulation, compared with the quantity of gold and silver seen in circulation. At first, the quantity of notes was very small indeed; the increase of this quantity was, for the first twenty years, very slow; and, though it became more rapid in the next twenty years, the quantity does not appear to have been large till the war which took place in 1755, before which time the Bank Company put out no notes under 20 pounds in amount. Then it was that they began to put out 15 pound notes, and afterwards, but during the same war, 10 pound notes. During all this time, loans, in every war, had been made by the government. That is to say, the government had borrowed money of individuals, in the same way as above-mentioned, in the year 1694, when the system of loans and stocks and funds was begun. The money thus borrowed was never paid off, but was suffered to remain at interest, and was, as it is now, called the NATIONAL DEBT, the interest upon which is annually paid out of the taxes raised upon the people. As this debt went on increasing, the bank-notes went on increasing, as, indeed, it is evident they must, seeing that the interest of the Debt was, as it still is and must be, paid in bank-notes.

It is not simply the quantity of bank-notes, that are put out into circulation, which will excite alarm as to their solidity; but, it is that quantity, if it be great, com-

pared with the quantity of gold and silver, seen in circulation. If, as the bank-notes increased, the circulating gold and silver had increased in the same proportion; then, indeed, bank-notes would still have retained their usual credit; people would still have had the same confidence in them. But, this could not be. From the nature of things it could not be. The cause of the increase of the bank-notes, was, the increase of the interest upon the National Debt; and, as it grew out of an operation occasioned by poverty, it would have been strange indeed had it been accompanied with a circumstance, which would have been an infallible indication of riches. Without, however, stopping here to inquire into the cause of the coin's not increasing with the increase of paper, suffice it to say, that such was the fact. Year after year we saw more of bank-notes and less of gold and silver; till, in time, such was the quantity of bank-notes required to meet the purposes of gold and silver in the payment of the interest of the still increasing Debt, and in the payment of the taxes, many other banks were opened, and they also issued their promissory notes. The Bank Company's notes, which had never before been made for less sums than 10 pounds, were, soon after the beginning of PITT's war, in 1793, issued for five pounds, after which it was not to be supposed, that people could have the same opinion of bank-notes that they formerly had. Every part of the people, except the very poorest of them, now, occasionally, at least, possessed bank-notes. Rents, salaries, yearly wages, all sums above five pounds, were now paid in bank notes; and, the government itself was now paid its taxes in this same sort of currency.

In such a state of things it was quite impossible that people should not begin to perceive, that gold and silver was better than bank-notes, and that they should not be more desirous of possessing the former than the latter; and, the moment this is the case, the banking system must begin to tremble; for, as the notes are payable to the bearer, and payable on demand, it is very certain, that no man, with such a preference in his mind, will keep in his possession a bank-note, unless we can suppose a man so absurd as to keep a thing, of the goodness of which he has some suspicion, however small, while, for merely opening his mouth or stretching forth his hand, he can exchange it for a thing of the

same nominal value, of which it is one else. "Public Credit," but, as it is not, "The credit," emphatically "ASLEEP." Those of 1793, succeeding like those of 1793, bank-notes, picture showing putting for appear to month of February, awake. The part of the immediate consequence, count of the totally changed transaction produce, in of the money subject of while I am

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HOLLAND When I was referred to, persuasion that the I to leave I inactivity for some mind to the now set to make sources of annoying, England. viction, I over to the nary the the notion had been relative to exist among change was for which son, seen put away dered in agent of



same nominal value, and of the goodness of which it is impossible for him or any one else to entertain any suspicion. "Public Credit," as it has been called, but, as it may more properly be called, "*The credit of bank-notes*," has been emphatically denominated, "SUSPICION ASLEEP." In the midst of events like those of 1793 and the years immediately succeeding; in the midst of circumstances like those above-mentioned, relating to the bank-notes, it was impossible that SUSPICION should sleep any longer. The putting forth of the 5 pound bank-notes appear to have roused it, and, in the month of February, 1797, it became broad awake. The stoppage of payment on the part of the Bank Company was the immediate consequence; but, a particular account of that important event, which totally changed the nature of all our money transactions, and which will, in the end, produce, in all human probability, effects of the most serious nature, must be the subject of a future letter. In the mean while I am,

Your friend,

WM. COBBETT.

State Prison, Newgate, Thursday,

30th August, 1810.

#### SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

HOLLAND (*continued from page 239.*) When I was writing the article, here referred to, I was deeply impressed with the persuasion, that we should very soon find, that the Emperor Napoleon did not mean to leave Holland any longer in a state of inactivity. I had thought of the matter for some time, and I had made up my mind to this settled opinion; that he would now set seriously and sedulously to work to make use of the immense naval resources of Holland for the purpose of annoying, and, if possible, of subjugating England. This being my sincere conviction, I endeavoured to bring my readers over to that conviction, and, as a preliminary thereto, to remove from their minds, the notions, with which some of our writers had been endeavouring to buoy them up, relative to *discontents*, which were said to exist amongst the Dutch, *on account of the change* which had recently taken place, for which *discontents* I could see no reason, seeing that the change had merely put away one, who could never be considered in any other light than that of an agent of Napoleon, and had introduced a

few more *foreign troops* than were already in the country.—I am satisfied, that the danger of this country consists chiefly in the want of preparation in the minds of the people. The object of but too many amongst us appears to be to keep the people in the dark, at all events, to the last moment. Else, why should attempts be made to persuade them, even to this day, that the Dutch are about to resist the Emperor Napoleon's orders and decrees? The danger, which this country has to apprehend from the side of Holland is, one would think, so evident, that every man must see it. Yet, instead of preparing the minds of the people for this danger, our ministerial writers seem to have formed a deliberate plan for making the people of England believe, that, so far from Napoleon's being able to *attack us* from Holland, he is likely to be *attacked himself by Holland*. Shocking infatuation! If this infatuation continue, what must be the consequence?

—As I wish for the people of this country to see their danger, to see the real state of Holland and of its means of attacking us, I have resumed, or rather continued, my former article upon the subject, and I shall now add some observations, for which I had not then time.—It is said, in speaking of the Dutch *National Debt*, that Napoleon has decreed a bankruptcy in Holland, and "*appropriated TO HIMSELF the two third parts of the public stocks of that nation.*" This is said in the Courier news-paper of the 29th of August. I did not so understand the matter; nor do I, upon a second look at the decree, so understand it now. It may be considered as being rather bold, to differ from so wise a man as the Editor of the Courier; but, I am pretty certain, that I am right in my construction of the decree, which, if words when used by Napoleon have their usual meaning, says that two thirds of the interest of the Debt shall be no longer paid; and, of course, that there will not be taxes raised to pay those two thirds, as there used to be, in consequence of which there must, of necessity, be less taxes raised in Holland, on account of the Debt.—See the decree, at page 83 of this volume, and see also the Report of the Duke of Cadore, at page 79. It is impossible to read these documents, and not to see that what the Courier has published upon this subject is not true; and that, if it be not intended to deceive the public, it must have a tendency thereunto.—This matter of the *Dutch Debt* is very ma-



terial indeed, because it is, as we have been told, on account of the reduction of the interest upon this Debt, that the people of Holland are so outrageously discontented. If the decree be what I have described it to be; that is to say, if it relieves the Dutch from paying two thirds of the taxes that they used to pay on account of the Debt, I really cannot, in that, discover any cause for discontent amongst the people in general. The persons who have to receive one third, that is to say, *ten* shillings where they used to receive *thirty* shillings; such persons may, indeed, very reasonably be discontented; but, when we are calculating upon the effects of popular discontent against the power of a government, we always speak of the feelings of the *many* and not of the *few*. Besides, if it be really true, that the dear good Dutchmen are angry and seditiously inclined, because they have ten shillings instead of thirty to pay to the Stock-holder; if this be really true, there is a very easy, expeditious, and safe remedy: they have only to take the money out of their pockets and pay the creditors the two third parts themselves, which Napoleon would hardly prevent by "a restriction bill." Let them, then, be as discontented as our news-papers can make them on any other account; let them rise in insurrection in every corner of the country; but, let it not be under the pretence, that they are not permitted to pay their debts honestly, which they may do if they please, notwithstanding Napoleon's decree.—Let us now turn to what has transpired since my last Number was written: I allude to the declarations, made by Napoleon, relative to Holland, in his answer to the address of the Dutch, presented to him, on the occasion of his birth-day.—We have always found, in all the stages of the French government, that they intended to do what they threatened to do; and, I can see no reason why this should not still be the case.—Let us, therefore, hear, and pay good attention to what Napoleon now threatens; for, we may be assured, that, if he fail to put his threats in execution, it will not be for want of the disposition.—He says to the Dutch:—"I gave you a Prince of my blood for your Ruler; this was intended as a bond to unite the concerns of your Republic with the rights of this Empire. My hopes have been deceived; and on this occasion I have shewn more forbearance than my character gene-

rally admits and my rights required. I have at length put a period to the painful uncertainty of your future fate, and warded off the fatal blow which threatened to annihilate all your property and all your resources. I have opened the Continent to your national industry. The day shall come when you are to conduct my eagles to the seas celebrated by the exploits of your ancestors. Then shall you shew yourselves worthy of yourselves and of me. From this moment till that period, all the changes that take place in Europe shall have for their first motive the destruction of that tyrannical and irrational system which the English Government, unmindful of the pernicious consequences which arise therefrom to its own country, has adopted, to outlaw commerce and trade, and subject it to the arbitrary authority of English licences.—Gentlemen, Deputies of the Legislative Body, and of the land and sea forces, of Holland—and Gentlemen Deputies of my good City of Amsterdam, tell my subjects of Holland, I feel perfectly satisfied they possess the sentiments they profess for me; tell them, that I doubt not their loyalty attachment, and depend on their heartily joining their exertions to those of the rest of my subjects, to re-conquer the rights of the sea, the loss of which, five coalitions, incited by England, have inflicted on the continent; tell them, that in all circumstances they may reckon on my peculiar protection."—Thus, as the reader will see, my opinions, upon this subject, as given last week, were pretty correct. I then said, that the change had been made principally, if not wholly, with a view to the execution of designs against England; and, I, therefore, besought my readers not to be cheated, not to be lured away from this object, by any stories, any hatched tales, about the *discontents*, which the change had created amongst the Dutch. The same writers, who made these attempts at cheating and luring the public with Dutch discontents, are now, upon seeing the Address of the Dutch Deputies, which, in point of "loyalty" may, perhaps, equal, but, in point of *adulation* certainly does not equal many other addresses that I have read in my lifetime; upon seeing this address, which it was impossible to keep out of print in England, and equally impossible to alter very materially, without detection and exposure; upon seeing this address, so flatly contradicting all their assertions,

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and baffling all the false hopes, which they had found it their interest to endeavour to excite; upon seeing this address, they took short about, and, after pretty nearly a month spent in condoling with the poor good Dutch, and lamenting that so worthy, such an excellent, discontented, and seditious people should be so cruelly oppressed; after this, kept up for nearly a month, they, upon seeing the "*dutiful* and *loyal*" address before-mentioned, turn short round upon the charmingly discontented Dutch, and assail both them and their "*prince and father*" in the following terms.—"The *Moniteur* of the 18th contains the Address of the Dutch Deputies to Buonaparté, and the Reply of the Tyrant to the *meanly* *adulatory*, and *disgustingly fulsome* language of the *degenerated* sons of the once noble, independent, and high spirited Hollanders, who, in making their abject submission to the common oppressor of the Continent, do not blush to allude to the heroic and successful exertions of their ancestors to resist a *foreign tyranny*, and by which they obtained and so long preserved that independence which formerly had been the proud and just boast of every true and honest Batavian. Never, certainly, was a reply more suitably made to such an Address; for, while the *degraded* Hollanders *crull* in the state of thralldom to which, by his *egregious infamy* they have been reduced, Buonaparté boasts of the conquests he has, in like manner, obtained over the independence of so many other nations of the Continent, and does not hesitate to take credit to himself to have rivetted the chains of the *once happy* countries of Italy, Switzerland, &c. as well as of the once "*High and Mighty*," but now poor and wretched States of Holland. If any additional proof were wanting of the total disregard of every principle of truth and honour in this *detestable tyrant*, it would be found in the allusion which he makes to the recent acts of the British Government. It is not necessary for us now to remind our Readers that our Orders of Council, of which the Tyrant continues to complain, were merely retaliative of his most *unprincipled* and *outrageous* Decrees against us; and yet has he the *shameless effrontery* to say, even to the face of those very people who have most suffered by his wanton restraints upon every commercial pursuit, that the system of the

British Government is "*tyrannical* and "*irrational*," and that to its destruction "*all his future exertions are to be directed*. What *matchless impudence* and *falsehood*! As to the threat of his eagles being about to be conveyed to the sea, we shall only for the present observe, that the sooner they are sent, the sooner will our brave tars be afforded the opportunity they desire of effectually "*clipping their wings*."—Yes, let us hope so; but, we could have hoped this, and we could have said this, without accompanying it; without accompanying either the hope or the prayer, with any of the nonsense or the hypocrisy that precedes it. It is very laudable in any Englishman to meet a menace like that of Napoleon with defiance; because, however erroneous the judgment, the feeling is right; but, this defiance derives no credit from the blustering abuse, the falsehood, the nonsense, and the hypocrisy with which it is accompanied, and which seems to be far too much overstrained to flow from a disinterested source.—But, before we make any further observations upon this article from the Morning Post (of the 27th of August), let us hear what its twin brother, the Courier, of the same day, contained upon the same subject.—"If any thing can add to the degradation of a people, *cursed and conquered by Buonaparté*, it is the manner in which he makes them return thanks for having destroyed their prosperity and rights, and celebrate him as the worker of good, who has proved himself in every action the demon of evil. Our readers will find in another part of our Paper, the Address of the Dutch Legislature and Council of State, the Deputies of the Land and Sea Forces, and of the City of Amsterdam. The *hatred*, the *loathing*, and *disgust* which the Dutch have against the French Government and its Chief, are notorious; yet are these Deputies made to thank him for having united them with his happy subjects; and to hope that, by their obedience and attachment to their Prince and Father, they shall preserve the protection of a *generous, upright, and benovolent Government!!!* And to add to the *insult* and *mockery* of the scene, and to make their shame and their disgrace complete, they are made to take a retrospective view of their history, and say, "*they are still possessed of a strong re-*



"collection of the virtues of their fore-fathers." What a grovelling and contemptible shape do men and nations sometimes assume! To have read such an Address, without knowing from whence it proceeded, one would have supposed it to be an Address to some *Persian Satrap*, an Address from some of those Eastern Nations which have never enjoyed the light and life of Liberty, and in which man is the only growth that lingers."—"But that the Dutch, the descendants of De Witt, and Trompe and De Ruyter, of men who defied and defeated all the power of Spain, that they should be compelled to class slavery among the blessings of life, and to bestow (except by way of irony and scorn) upon that Prince of Darkness, Buonaparté, the appellation of *Father*, is most galling and afflicting indeed!"—The *Courier* has this difference from his brother: he looks upon the poor good Dutch as having been made to thank Buonaparté. This idea is not quite original; and, indeed, it has been suspected, that many and many a most dutiful, loyal, and affectionate address would never have seen the light, without the assistance of the fears or the hopes of the addressers; and, in every such case, disguise the thing how you may, the addressers are made to do what they do; but, there is this difference, that, to yield to open palpable force is not a millionth part so disgraceful as the base hypocrisy of pretending to act in such a case from motives of real affection. A brave and faithful people may have the misfortune to be made slaves, and may be compelled, at the point of the bayonet, to do many acts of apparent meanness; but, then, where this is the case, the facts are known to the world; the baseness, the insult, the mockery, is, in cases, where all the names, and all the outward forms, of freedom are preserved, and all the substance of slavery and tyranny practised: there it is, that men's feelings are outraged; there it is that insult and mockery sting the soul.—Both these editors seem to be particularly offended with the word "*father*," made use of, upon this occasion, by the Dutch Deputies; but for what reason I know not, except that they grudge the French and Dutch even their fooleries. Why should not they use the word *father*, upon such occasions, as well as other people? I am sure I have seen it used with as little truth, and with even less propriety. Scores of addresses have I seen

much more fulsome and more impudently false than this of the Dutch Deputies; and, though that may be no justification for the Dutch Deputies, it may, at least, form something of an excuse for them. Aye, take my word for it, there are baser slaves upon earth than the Dutch Deputies. They, if what these editors say be true, are compelled to do what they do; while there are in the world wretches, who do worse from choice, or, at least, without any other motive than that of gain; and who, at the same time, have the "matchless impudence and falsehood" to boast of the possession of liberty, about which neither Napoleon nor the Dutch Deputies say one word.—Now, as to the threats of the Emperor, they do not, I must confess, contain any thing, which I did not expect to hear from him much sooner; and, I am thoroughly persuaded, that he will leave nothing unattempted in order to fulfil them. Our fault has hitherto been, that we have set dangers wholly at defiance, or have suffered ourselves to be alarmed out of our senses. And, mind this, the latter will always be the case with those, who will never see danger at a distance. I want my country to see its danger now, while that danger is at a distance; and I beseech my readers to bear in mind, that I now warn the public against believing those, who are using all their endeavours to persuade us, that we are safe in consequence of the discontents and the seditious movements now existing and going on against Napoleon.—Holland is, it must be evident to every one, the point from which England is the most easily assailed. The land is nearly in sight; and, the distance, with a fair wind, is not more than four or five hours sail. The Duke of Cadore, in his report upon Holland, states, that, in the course of the ensuing year (from the 9th of July) there can be 40 sail of the line assembled in the Scheldt and the Texel. Perhaps this is a little over-strained; but, suppose there should be 30 sail, well crammed with troops; and this number, I think, may and will be assembled. The consequence of the bare existence of such an armament would be, a fleet of ours kept off the coast of Holland, all weathers and seasons; and, besides that, an army kept embodied in our Eastern counties. The Fleet, so prepared, need never stir, except for the purpose of making demonstrations. By remaining pretty nearly still, it would find occupation for a very large fleet, a

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large body of land troops, and for all our news-papers. If people hoarded their money (the gold and silver money, I mean) in 1803, when there was little more than bare threats, what would they do, if such an armament were *actually seen on float*? "They would not hoard gold," says Mrs. de Yonge, "I'll answer for that." Very likely, Madam; but would you answer for their not hoarding the shillings and the big copper-pennies?—I hope, and trust, that, if such an armament were to make an attempt to come out, it would be defeated; but, what have *hopes* to do in the forming of *opinions*? We are, in a case like this, to calculate what is likely to be, or what is possible to be; and not what we, or any body else, may *wish* for or *hope* for. Base and wicked is he who does not wish for the welfare of his country; but, what has that wish to do in influencing the fate of his country?—In the case before us, we are to consider, not what we wish might be, but what reason says is likely to be, and also what is possible to be. In the first place, then, no one can doubt, I think that it is *possible* for Napoleon to assemble, in the Territories of Holland, in the course of one year, a *fleet of thirty sail of the line*; and, that he could easily fill them with troops all the world knows. Our fleet, placed to watch this fleet, could not *always* keep the sea. There would be times when, for its own preservation, it must come from its station, and seek shelter in port. In that case, the enemy may come over if he will. All must depend upon winds and tides, and on whatever depends upon winds and tides no dependence is to be placed. If twenty or thirty thousand men were *landed*, I shall, as a matter of course, suppose, that, after a little while, at least, they would be defeated, and destroyed, or captured. But, the worst of it is, that even in that case, our *success* does not *put an end to our danger*; for, to our enemy, what is the loss of 20 or 30,000 men? In such a case, the loss of lives to us must be considerable, and who can fail to perceive the mischiefs that must arise from the alarm, especially if, at the same time, we were threatened from Boulogne or any other port of France? Such attempts, supposing Napoleon to have no other object but this kingdom to attend to, might be made several times in a year, without any very serious inconvenience to him; while, with respect to us, unless we pursue, and steadily pursue, a system of defence, at once cheap and ef-

ficacious, the inconvenience would be intolerable. It is to be observed that if an armament, such as I have been speaking of, would require on our part an *additional* naval force; and, of course, a heavy additional expence. Indeed, it must be manifest to every one that reflects, that the season for great exertions on our part is now approaching. It requires merely a look at the situation of Europe to enable one to determine this point. For years past, the whole of the forces of Napoleon have been carried away from us. He himself has been, no small part of that time, on the other side of Europe. And therefore, we must necessarily conclude that our exertions must now be greater, than they have of late years been, and that the necessity for such exertions will every day increase. Yet, it is at this time that we are told that retrenchments in expence are absolutely necessary. We were told this, during the last session of Parliament by Mr. Huskisson, Mr. Rose, and several others, who did not indeed propose to begin by the cutting off of *sinicures*; but who did very distinctly declare that retrenchment was necessary, and absolutely necessary. We shall probably see, during the next session of Parliament, the branches, upon which these gentlemen propose to begin with their retrenchments; but, if I am not very much deceived indeed, they will have to provide a new fleet for a defence against Holland, or to acknowledge that our present naval establishment has long been too great. —In estimating the feelings of the Dutch towards Napoleon, and, of course, in estimating his means of raising a naval force in Holland, there are two circumstances, which we are apt to overlook. The first of these is, that the Dutch nation have now been *seventeen* years under the dominion of France. The children who were ten years of age, when the French conquered Holland, are now men and women of twenty seven years of age. The active population of Holland, therefore, have been brought up under the French, and with a taste for French principles. —The other circumstance is, that there were great discontents prevailing in Holland, long before the invasion by the French. The people had not forgotten or forgiven the *calling in of the Prussians*, in 1786, which gave rise to the banishment, voluntary, or involuntary, of great numbers of the most intelligent and most spirited men in the country. These men, in general,



sought refuge in France; and when the French revolution took place, they became the representatives of all the discontented in Holland, with whom they held constant communication; they urged the French government to invade their country, and they themselves opened the way for the invaders.—This circumstance, so important when estimating the disposition of the Dutch towards the French, has scarcely ever been noticed in this country. We have *wondered* and *wondered* and *wondered* how it was that the French walked through the chain of formerly strong fortresses into Holland; we have been indignant at the Dutch for not fighting in defence of their country; we have called them by all manner of names because they did not bury themselves in the last ditch of their fortifications; but, if we had borne in mind the event, which I have here referred to, our wonder would have ceased; or, rather, it would never have existed.—Upon the whole, then, according to any view that I am able to take of Holland, I cannot help being fully persuaded, that Napoleon will be able to draw forth all its immense naval means, and to give them a terrible direction towards this country; and this being my persuasion, I cannot refrain from again and again calling upon the public to be so prepared for the event as to be able to look it steadily in the face. It is very injurious to the cause of the country to give way to such shameful abuse as that above-quoted from the Morning Post and the Courier. It misleads many persons. It gives a passionate and foolish direction to the mind; and it must, if those abusive prints can ever be read abroad, do our character great injury amongst foreigners, who will, doubtless, say, what is eternally true, that, those who resort to abuse, feel the want of truth on their side.

JACOBIN GUINEAS.—Mrs. de Yonge gave us a pretty good account of the manner, in which these disaffected gentry got off out of the kingdom; and, it seems, that a considerable part of them have made their way into France, in spite of all obstacles; for, it appears that there has been a decree recently passed in France, for the purpose of regulating the rate, at which foreign coin shall pass. Some part of our gold has gone to France in exchange for corn; but I take it, the far greater part of the English gold now in France, has gone thither after the manner so ably ex-

plained by Mrs. de Yonge.—Whether the report of the Bullion Committee will induce any of these Jacobin Guineas to return home, is more than I can say; but I am very certain, that, it will not induce them to return, until there be a paper price and a gold price openly acknowledged and acted upon.—It is worthy of remark how much greater the interest is, which is now excited in the country, respecting paper money, than it ever was upon any former occasion. Men seem to have taken quite new views of the subject. The day light of science seems to have broken in upon them all at once. The vulgar notions about *balance of trade* and *dearness* and *paying off the national debt* and the like have all vanished in an instant, and you can hardly meet with a man who retains any such phrases in his conversation. This is a great thing gained; for when once men understand the matter clearly, they will not be long before they will act as they ought.—There have been, within these ten days, some more articles published in the Morning Post, levelled at the Country Banks. From these articles, the source of which it is by no means difficult to guess at, I should imagine, that there was really some scheme on foot with respect to these banks; and if there is we shall see most curious work before next First of April.

"MATCHLESS IMPUDENCE."—This is a quality, which the Morning Post, in a passage above-quoted, has given to the Emperor Napoleon; but, while we give this writer full credit for his modesty, let us do him that justice, which he has not done himself; for, I think, that there can be no doubt at all, that, as to the quality here spoken of he surpasses all the world. This one might fairly conclude from his general conduct; but, he has yesterday (30th of August) furnished us with an instance, which, even as a trait of impudence in him, does deserve particular notice.—The French news-paper, the *Moniteur*, has, it seems, cut some unsavoury jokes upon the state of our *foreign commerce* and our *paper money*. A part of what it has said the Morning Post has published; and, some of it is very sensibly written.—The Morning Post, however, says that "a more preposterous farrago of false reasoning, gross misrepresentation, and rank falsehood, has never insulted common sense."—But, it seems, that the efforts of the writer are calculated, accord-

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ing to this same Morning Post, to produce mischievous effects.—Let us take his words:—"We received last night a regular series of Moniteurs and other Paris Papers to the 21st. The most remarkable article of their contents is a pretended letter from Hamburgh, in which the most hostile language towards England is used, and in which the writer most zealously co-operates with COBBETT and the other mischievous scribes of faction among us, who so incessantly labour to bring our Government into disrepute, to destroy the Public credit of the country, and give a mortal stab to its best interests. A more preposterous farrago of false reasoning, gross misrepresentation, and rank falsehood, has never insulted common sense. We have neither time nor space to advert particularly upon it at present; nor indeed is any animadversion necessary, where falsehood is so exposed as to be open to detection, even by the most shallow understanding."—This writer does not attempt to give any proof of these charges; but, at the conclusion of the article, which he has taken from the MONITEUR, he says, that the French writer, in aid of his arguments, makes "a quotation from Cobbett's Register." Why does not the Morning Post publish this quotation; or, at least, refer to it. I have not the Moniteur; and should be very much obliged to any one, who may possess the Number alluded to, to lend it me for an hour.—This writer of the Morning Post talks of writers, who labour to destroy public credit; but, what does he mean by public credit? There is no credit wanted except that of bank-notes, the largest class of which this writer himself has called "destructive assignats."—In his paper of the 19th of July, he called the Country Bank notes (forming more than the half of our circulating medium) "destructive assignats", and in his paper of the 9th of August, he calls them "vile, dirty rags;" and yet, when the French writers repeat something of this sort, and foretell that our paper will never be exchanged into gold and silver, he has the impudence to tell his readers, that the French are co-operating with Cobbett and the other mischievous scribes of faction. If this be not "MATCHLESS IMPUDENCE" where are we to look for it in this world? He himself calls our bank-notes "destructive assignats;" he calls them "vile, dirty rags;" he publishes article after article intended to shew the worthlessness of

them; nay, he strenuously recommends their abolition; and, after all this; after all these endeavours to annihilate all the credit that is now given to more than one half of our circulating medium; after all this, upon seeing that the French writers say the same thing of our paper money that he has said, he turns round upon those whom he chooses to call scribes of faction, and imputes to them the mischievous act of having given the French their cue upon this subject.—But, leaving this modest gentleman to the opinions of the public, what a stupid thing it is for us to suppose, that a matter like that of the state of our paper-money can be kept a secret. What gross folly this must be; and especially now that the Report of the Bullion Committee has been published in all the news-papers. Such nonsense never was before heard of. One would really think the man was mad. Both he and his fellow labourer of the COURIER have fallen upon the poor French writer with their whole stock of filth. Just as if we should not do the same, were we in the place of the French. Nay; just as if we did not do the same, with respect to the paper-money in France, the destruction of which we so long wished for, and at the accomplishment of which wish we so loudly exulted. It is, therefore, childish to the last degree; it is quite babyish; it is despicable beyond description, for us to make complaints against the French writers, and to get into a passion with, and abuse, them, because they make themselves merry upon the subject of our Bank-notes. Were the French, indeed, to set people at work to forge our Bank-notes; were the French government to employ and pay people for forging Bank notes, and other people to introduce them into the country; in that case, indeed, we might have something to say; but, even then, perhaps, we might just as well hold our tongues.—Besides, what, after all, do these French writers expect that their country will get by the destruction of our paper? Did we get any thing by the destruction of their paper? To hear the Morning Post, one would imagine, that the French were to gain, and that we were to be undone, by the destruction of our paper-money. But, France was not undone by the destruction of her paper-money; and, let it be observed too, that that destruction took place in the midst of a most expensive war. The like, and under like circumstances, took place in America; but, so



far was the event from being ruinous to America, that it was, in fact, one of the great causes of her success and prosperity. The paper-money of AUSTRIA was *not* destroyed; but, Austria herself was subdued; and *now* she is doing away her paper-money. So that, though our paper-money may be a very good subject for a joke with the French writers, there are none of them who reflect that will anticipate any very great advantage to their country from its destruction, and this destruction of it is the very worst that even they suppose can take place. I have, from the time that I first touched upon the subject, given it as my opinion that our paper-money would be destroyed; but I have always insisted, that it would rather add to than diminish the power of the nation, and to all the means of its happiness and security.

PORTUGAL.—Cheering as our prospects, with regard to the war in this country, were last week, they appear, from our ministerial news-papers (which ought to be the best informed) to be much more so now, seeing, that, as these papers inform us, MASSENA'S forces are afflicted with a dysentery, while our troops are happily free from this disease;—that the main body of the French army, instead of advancing so rapidly as their admirers in this country anticipated, have retreated behind the Coa, perhaps for the want of provisions;—that general Balhazar, with 20,000 Portuguese militia was in the province of Braganza, fully prepared to meet the French;—that Romana had 20,000 men under him, and was marching to intercept another body of French;—that the *spirit* of desertion still continued to prevail among the enemies ranks;—that several deserters had come home by the last convoy, and that several more had arrived at Lisbon;—that the enemies languid operations had falsified the predictions of lords Grenville and Grey;—that the Portuguese troops looked like real soldiers, and from what they had already done much might be expected from them;—that it is doubted whether Massena with 100,000 men would be able to carry one particular point of our defence;—that there are reports, that Massena is in full retreat, owing to want of provisions, great desertion, disaffection of the foreigners in his army, and sickness;—that it is well known that the mortality in the French army had, for a long time,

been prodigious;—that my lord Talavera's army was in the highest health and spirits;—that the anxiety for a battle with Massena's army was general in our army;—that my lord Talavera certainly once offered battle to Massena, and that Massena as certainly declined the offer;—that the English army was in a most healthy state and that provisions and vegetables were in great abundance;—that the average number of deserters from the French army was from 90 to 100 a day, and that the number would be six times as great, were it not for the zeal of our friends the Portuguese, who, whenever they saw any thing in the *shape* of a French man, dispatched him without mercy;—that the first regiment of Portuguese dragoons had fallen upon some French cavalry, and had beaten and pursued them;—that a French corps had been fallen upon by a body of Spanish and had been driven back with great loss;—that a Portuguese corps had beaten the French near Braganza, and totally destroyed the whole body, except two officers, and one private, who made their escape;—that on the 16th of August Massena had retreated five leagues, and that the Spaniards were rising in the north of Spain;—that in the provinces in the north of Spain near Portugal 30,000 men may easily be raised;—that there are several thousands already on foot;—that between 6 and 700 German troops, who had deserted from the French, were fighting together with the Spanish and *seemed hearty in the cause*;—that in these parts also, the desertion from the French was continual, and the enthusiasm of the Spanish and Portuguese so great that they were determined to *go all lengths*.—But, what is of most importance is the *proof* that we now possess of the excellent disposition of the Portuguese both civil and military; and this we have now under the hand of MARSHAL BERESFORD himself. In my last, as the reader will remember, I commented (at page 240) upon a paragraph, whence one might have supposed, that the Portuguese were deserting from us, it being stated that some of them had gone away from us, and that some of these had been punished, and others sent to work in the mines. Now, however, we have a complete contradiction of this, and that, too, under the hand of Marshal Beresford, in whose part of the army the desertion was said to have taken place. The fol-

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lowing letter from the Marshal to his Excellency DON P. FORJAZ, dated Lagiosa, 7 August, 1810, settles the point with regard to the disposition and conduct of the Portuguese.—“It gives me much pleasure to inform your Excellency of the excellent dispositions of all classes of people throughout this part of the kingdom, shewing every where the utmost zeal and loyalty in defence of their country, and the most decided detestation of the common enemy, who justly deserves it, by his unwarrantable conduct, and by the acts of violence and excesses of every description, which he daily commits. In all places, the people rather leave their homes, than submit to the necessity of affording the enemy any kind of assistance, and thus evince the most ardent love of their country. The peasants also oppose the enemy, wherever it is in their power, and a light party of them, consisting of one hundred men, under the command of a person called Joze Hiberio, attacked, on the 3d instant, in St. Caeta, a detachment of French troops, 25 of whom they killed, and took several heads of cattle, which they brought to me, but which I gave them leave to sell for their own use and benefit. I have formed them into a company, and given the command thereof to the above Hiberio, on account of his gallant and patriotic conduct, with the rank of ensign in the army.”—Here, then, we have it officially stated to us, that the Portuguese, of all classes, behave in the most excellent manner. I am a little puzzled; indeed, to reconcile this with the official notification of Lord Viscount Talavera, who says, under the date of the 1st of August: “It having come to my knowledge, that certain persons have been sent by the enemy into the interior of the kingdom with letters and messages for different individuals, cities, and towns, all such persons shall be arrested as criminal, and sent with the letters, with which they may be charged, to my head-quarters. Those who shall receive letters from the enemy’s army, and not apprehend the bearers of them, shall be considered as accomplices, and subjected to the most rigorous punishment.”—Now, at first sight, it would appear strange, that such an order as this should be necessary in a country, where Marshal Beresford’s Order had just been issued; for, if the people, of all classes, entertained and showed “the most decided detestation of the enemy,”

where was that enemy to find individuals and cities and towns to send his letters and messages to? But, though to reconcile the contents of these two documents may be too much for me, it will, I dare say, be very easily done by the editor of the Morning Post, and, for the present to him I will leave the performance of so pleasing a task, adding, upon this occasion, only this one other observation, namely, that, if the above information (all taken from the Morning Post) be true, there are now 20,000 Portuguese Militia, and 20,000 Spaniards under Romana, together with all the bodies of deserters from the French army, to be added to the SIXTY THOUSAND FIGHTING MEN, whom we are paying in Portugal, and who are all in good health and have an abundance of provisions, while the French army is wasting away daily and hourly with sickness, famine, and desertion. Under such circumstances we may, I think, without any anxiety, wait with patience for the result, and that that result may be such as to spare the lives and limbs and health of the British army is the sincere hope of

WM. COBBETT.

State Prison, Newgate, Friday,

31st August, 1810.

N. B. In consequence of numerous letters inquiring, whether broken sets of the REGISTER can be completed, I think it necessary to state here that they may, at present; but, that gentlemen who wish to have their sets completed, must apply without loss of time; at least before the 15th of September.

## COBBETT’S Parliamentary Debates:

The Fifteenth, Sixteenth, and Seventeenth Volumes of the above Work are in the Press, and will be published with all proper dispatch. All Communications will be carefully attended to; but it is particularly requested that they may be forwarded as early as possible.

### OFFICIAL PAPERS.

SPAIN.—Official Proclamation, dated Cadix, July 12.

Citizens of Cadix;—Your wishes are now to be accomplished with those of all



Spain. Your sacred rights, forgotten and nearly lost, will be restored by the Cortes to be convened in the following month. You are about to exercise the solemn functions of Legislators, of which you have been deprived by tyranny, falsely called legitimate and sovereign authority. With difficulty we have arrested the sword of power, which has caused the evils that we deplore, to return to you your just claim to have independent Representatives who shall watch over your happiness. The oppressor of human nature would not have advanced so far in his attempts at universal despotism, if the nations under his iron sway had known how to maintain the dignity of men and citizens, which knowledge constitutes the vigour and strength of empire. History, citizens, has taught us by more than one example how much Spain has been indebted to that heroic fortitude, which, in our Cortes, has made Kings themselves amenable for the abuse of their power. Remember that Princes have sometimes treated you as if they had no duties, and you no rights, and as if the uttering of your complaints were a crime against the State.—Commence then your duties in Spain, which is as free to you as it was to your ancestors. For this purpose employ the right of suffrage, which you enjoy by nature and by the Constitution of your country; and let not intrigue and seduction surprise you in the very asylum of your liberty, dictating to you the selection which ought to be the unbiassed exercise of your will and pleasure. Favour, friendship, rank and property give no title, and it is not by men possessing these that the country is to be saved. Patriotism, talent, merit proved by experience, these it is that should claim your attention. He who solicits your vote, and employs artifices to attract public approbation, estimates at a low rate the independence of a generous people, and ought to be marked by you as a suspicious character. True patriotism possesses too much genuine modesty to be the hero of its own story; and would rather convince you by deeds than words that it deserves your confidence.—Neither ought you to forget that you are responsible to your children and posterity for the

faithful discharge of your duty on this occasion. Since the re-establishment of the Monarchy you are perhaps the only Spaniards who have enjoyed so fair an opportunity to give permanence and solidity to civil institution. If, after two years of uncertainty and vacillation, when you have been so often brought to the edge of the precipice, you do not yet discover the origin of your calamities to consist in the imperfect representation of the national will, what will be the consequence? The Government and all good citizens will lament your culpable blindness, and they will have at least the negative consolation of knowing that history will point out you as the destroyers of your family, and the assassins of your country.—You cannot now justify yourselves, as at the commencement of the revolution, by the consternation into which the enemy threw the country, so that having no means of choosing and examining, you were given up to clamorous pretenders, who availed themselves of the confusion to domineer over you; nor can you vindicate yourselves by professing that you are the dupes of intrigue, as the painful experience of two years has taught you how to detect and despise it. You are now enabled to exercise calm reflection, and to overcome those influences which designing men would dispense to deceive you.—Recollect, that according as you act rightly or wrongly, you establish the honour or fix the disgrace of Spain; every thing depends upon the integrity of the Members of the august Assembly, which is solemnly to declare the immutable principles of justice, and to consecrate before tyrants the hallowed rights of nations.—This Superior Junta earnestly hopes, that considering the importance of the business entrusted to you, and rigidly observing the rules prescribed to you for the election, you will prevent any corrupt interference, and you will preserve in your recollection, that if you are unfaithful, you will do all in your power to promote the eternal disgrace of your posterity.—By order of the Superior Junta,

LOUIS DE GARGOLLO, Sec.

To Andres Lopez, President,  
Cadiz, June 8, 1810.